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Abstract
While governments increasingly outsource activities to private actors, it remains an open question whether state actors can shift responsibility by means of outsourcing. Who is made responsible for outsourced action in the public sphere? Do governments avoid responsibility if they delegate or orchestrate unpopular activities? Based on a theoretical explanation, this study shows how governance design affects the public allocation of political responsibility. Its analysis of the quality press in four US foreign policy scandals demonstrates how the allocation of responsibility changes if it is not intelligence services or the state department that act, but private contractors or quangos. As a result, this study challenges common assumptions in research on “blame shifting” and highlights gaps in democratic systems caused by new modes of governance.
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