American and Canadian Counterinsurgency Strategies in Afghanistan

“Federman Rodriguez sets out to resolve an intriguing puzzle: How did two countries with so great a disparity of national power, Canada and the United States, come to adopt similar military policies in Afghanistan in 2006-2011? International Relations theory and historical precedent would have predicted otherwise. Rodriguez’s highly readable volume provides a compelling explanation of Canadian and US foreign policy and sheds light on the opportunities and limitations of power in the international system.” --Elinor Sloan, Carleton University, Canada. “Federman Rodriguez adapts the theory of neoclassical realism to explain, despite vastly different capabilities, how Canada and the United States’ foreign and security policy in Afghanistan converged on a counterinsurgency campaign. He provides a theoretically unique and empirically rich analysis of the decisions made by each country. This book is important in understanding what happened to the ill-fated intervention in Afghanistan.” --Brian C. Schmidt, Carleton University, Canada. The book aims to explain the factors that brought about a high degree of similarity between American and Canadian foreign and security policies during the Afghanistan intervention. Specifically, it seeks to explain why, despite their different positions in the international distribution of power, the United States and Canada embraced similar counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies from 2005/2006 to 2011. During this time, the United States and Canada fought against insurgent groups, sought to maintain stabilized areas by mentoring Afghan forces, and invested in infrastructure and governance. These goals, which corresponded to the ‘clear,’ ‘hold,’ and ‘build’ COIN components, entailed sending troops and civilian officials to a war zone and committing financial resources. Federman Rodriguez is Assistant Professor of the Faculty of International Relations, Political and Urban Studies at Rosario University, Bogotá, Colombia.